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RESPONSE 
Exaggerated and Misleading Reports of the Death 
of Conditional Relevance 
Peter Tillers* 
I 
In 1980 the late Professor Vaughn C. Ball of the University of 
Georgia published an arttcle called The Myth of Conditional Rele-
vancy.1 Ball's article is widely admired. One well-known evidence 
scholar, Ronald J. Allen, liked Ball's article so much that he bor-
rowed its title word for word.2 Although the extent of Allen's en-
thusiasm for Ball's analysis may be unmatched, a good number of 
students of evidence - including this writer - have said that Ball's 
analysis of conditional relevance is both original and important.3 
Richard Friedman, by contrast, cannot be counted as one of Ball's 
more ardent admirers. Although Friedman does show due respect 
for Ball in his article in this issue of the Michigan Law Review, 4 he 
also finds fault with some parts of Ball's argument. 
Friedman's article is an important one. It is important in part 
precisely because Friedman's view of the problem of conditional 
relevance and conditional probative value is distinctive.s In addi-
tion, Friedman's article effectively serves as a timely reminder of a 
fundamental property of inference from evidence in the judicial 
process, namely, the hierarchical or chain-like character of factual 
inference in contexts such as adjudication. Friedman's argument 
about how judges should be directed to handle challenges to the 
admissibility of conditionally relevant and conditionally probative 
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1. Vaughn C. Ball, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 14 GA. L. REV. 435 (1980). 
2. Ronald J. Allen, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 871 (1992). 
3. See, e.g., 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 14.1, at 724-30 (Tiilers rev. ed. 1983) 
[hereinafter WIGMORE (Tiilers ed.)]; Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 10 
B.U. L. REv. 447, 448 (1990). 
4. Richard Friedman, Conditional Probative Value: Neoclassicism Without Myth, 93 
MICH. L. REV. - (1994). 
5. Friedman views conditional relevance as a special case of conditional probative value. 
Friedman, supra note 4, at (7-8 & 8 n.20]. 
478 
December 1994] Conditional Relevance 479 
evidence is likely to provoke a new round of much-needed scholarly 
debate about the more general and very important question of how 
the law should deal with the ineluctable phenomenon of hierarchi-
cal inference. 
II 
Friedman's article needs to be considered in context. The start-
ing point is Ball's truly seminal 1980 article. Professor Ball was ap-
parently a blunt fellow. He argued that the doctrine of conditional 
relevance is incoherent and unmanageable and that we ought to get 
rid of it. Friedman's general view of the conditional relevance doc-
trine is rather different from Ball's. Although Friedman agrees 
with Ball that the doctrine as it stands has flaws, he also sees a core 
of good sense in it. Hence, instead of arguing that the doctrine 
ought to be abolished, as Ball proposed, Friedman favors modifying 
it. 
Friedman is clearly right about one thing: there is a core of 
good sense in the conditional relevance doctrine. It is important to 
make a distinction between the phenomenon of conditional rele-
vance and conditional probative value, on the one hand, and the 
legal rules governing that phenomenon, on the other hand.6 If we 
wish, we can abolish the legal doctrines now governing conditional 
relevance and conditional probative value. Try as we might, how-
ever, we cannot get rid of the phenomenon of conditional relevance 
- or, more broadly speaking, the phenomenon of conditional pro-
bative value. Practically every inference from evidence to a fact in 
issue in litigation - and possibly every such inference - involves a 
series of inferences rather than just a single inference; that is, practi-
cally every inference from evidence to a factum probandum in a 
lawsuit involves a chain, or network, of inferences.7 Hence, the 
force of any single inference is practically always contingent upon, 
or affected by, at least one other inference.8 
6. Some years ago I made this point in a slightly different way. I said then that it is 
important to draw a distinction between conditional relevance as a legal doctrine and condi-
tional relevance as an analytical concept. See WIGMORE (Tillers ed.}, supra note 3, § 14.1, at 
703. 
7. The chain-like character of inference has been recognized by many observers. See, e.g., 
EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 185-86 (1963); DAVID A. SCHUM, 
THE EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABIUSTIC REASONING §§ 2.2.5, 3.1.3-.6 (1994); cf. 
Albert J. Moore, Inferential Streams: The Articulation and Illustration of the Trial Advocate's 
Evidentiary Intuitions, 34 UCLA L. REv. 611 (1987). 
8. Ball's view of the existence of the phenomenon of conditional relevance is unclear. I 
would like to think that Ball attacked conditional relevance as a "myth" only because he 
thought that the existing doctrine of conditional relevance rests on tire mistaken assumption 
that the phenomenon of conditional relevance is rare. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 1, at 455-56 
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Ball himself fully understood that the relevance of a great deal 
of evidence about a fact in issue - and possibly of all such evi-
dence - is in some sense contingent upon inferences about other 
facts. Ball's own critique of the conditional relevance doctrine rests 
in part on his thesis that the relevance of practically all evidence is 
in some sense conditional.9 Friedman's article, however, exposes a 
significant weakness in Ball's argument. Even if one believes - as 
I do - that Ball's expose of the flaws in the conditional relevance 
doctrine is generally on target, Friedman's argument shows that it is 
far from clear that Ball's proposed remedy for those flaws is the 
correct one. 
Ball's proposed remedy for the defects in the present condi-
tional relevance doctrine is the absence of any legal rule about con-
ditional relevance or conditional probative value; Ball wanted to 
abolish the doctrine without replacing it with a different one.to 
Although Friedman agrees with Ball that the conditional relevance 
doctrine as it now stands invites inappropriate judicial intervention 
in the fact-finding activities of juries, Friedman rejects Ball's propo-
sal for the complete abolition of the conditional relevance doctrine. 
Friedman advocates replacing the existing conditional relevance 
rule with a rule about conditionally probative evidence. (Friedman 
views conditional relevance as a special case of the more general 
phenomenon of conditional probative value. I think Friedman is 
right about this point.) 
Ball saw no need to replace the existing conditional relevance 
doctrine with an improved or different version of the doctrine. Ball 
believed that when a challenge is made to the relevance of condi-
tionally relevant evidence, trial judges should do what they already 
do - or are supposed to do - when the relevance of any kind of 
evidence is questioned. And what are trial judges ordinarily sup-
posed to do? How are they supposed to determipe whether evi-
dence is relevant? According to Ball, trial judges should articulate, 
or ask a lawyer in the case to articulate, one or more "evidential 
hypotheses" - which today we te.nd to call "generalizations" -
(discussing the frequency of conditionally relevant evidence under the existing conditional 
relevance rule); see also id. at 460 ("I believe that all offered evidence is conditionally rele-
vant, but that the conditions for relevancy are far other than those supposed in the received 
doctrine of conditional relevancy."). Nonetheless, as Friedman points out, see Friedman, 
supra note 4, at [6-7] n.17, in one part of his article Ball did go to considerable lengths in an 
apparent effort to show that conditional relevance problems do not really involve the phe-
nomenon of conditional relevance. See Ball, supra note 1, at 466-69 n.38. 
9. Ball, supra note 1, at 460. 
10. Id. at 466-69. 
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that appear to have the possibility of establishing a link between the 
challenged evidence and the fact in issue, the factum probandum.11 
The trial· judge should then m?ke a judgment about whether any 
such evidential hypothesis or generalization does in fact offer any 
(perceptible?) support for the proposed inference, the factum 
probandum.12 
In one sense, it is difficult to quarrel with Ball's account of the 
method that the trial judge should use to evaluate the relevance of 
conditionally relevant evidence. It is difficult to do so because prac-
tically all reputable evidence scholars have agreed for quite some 
time now that rational assessment of the force of a proposed factual 
inference requires the articulation and evaluation of the generaliza-
tions that seem - initially, at least - to offer some support for 
such an inference. So only a brave soul would venture to say that 
Ball was wrong in believing that generalization~ play an important 
part in judgments about the relevance of conditionally relevant evi-
dence. Nonetheless, there is something unsatisfactory about Ball's 
proposal that judges deal with problems of conditional relevance by 
consciously attending to evidential hypotheses. The difficulty is 
that Ball's proposed analytical technique is in certain respects unin-
structive. Indeed, if we are prepared to say that we already know 
about the importance of generalizations in inferential reasoning, we 
may be entitled to say that Ball's proposed analytical method for 
dealing with conditional relevance problems is vacuous. 
The obvious difficulty with Ball's proposal is that it says nothing 
at all about how trial judges should assess the relevance of evidence 
when the trier of fact can reach the inference that the proponent of 
the evidence wants to establish only by drawing at least one other 
inference. In other words, Ball's proposed method of analysis does 
not address the question of how the trial judge should deliberate 
about the relevance of evidence when the proffered evidence leads 
to .a fact in issue only by means of a chain of inferences. This is a 
serious failing because conditional relevance problems belong to a 
class of problems whose solution requires at least two separate in-
ferences. In short, if we know or believe, as I do, that conditional 
relevance problems - and, more generally, problems of condi-
tional probative value - have distinctive characteristics, 13 Ball's 
11. Id. at 460. 
12. Id. at 461-62. 
13. When I say that the problem of conditionally relevant and conditionally probative 
evidence is distinctive, I am not asserting or implying that such evidence is rare. (It is possible 
that the relevance and probative value of most evidence - and possibly of all evidence -
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proposed analytical method for dealing with conditional relevance 
problems seems unedifying. Ball's proposed analytical method may 
speak to the question of how one assesses a single step in an infer-
ential chain, but it seems to have nothing to say about how one 
should assess the relationships among the links or parts of an infer-
ential chain or network. 
Unlike Ball, Friedman does make some claims - quite a few 
claims, actually - about the structure of hierarchical inferential ar-
gument. Moreover, as I have already noted, Friedman advocates 
the adoption of a conditional probative value rule that in some cir-
cumstances effectively directs trial judges to think about the hierar-
chical, or chain-like, nature of a problem of evidence. Hence, 
whether or not Friedman is correct about the structure of hierarchi-
cal inferential problems or about how the law should handle such 
problems, no one can accuse Friedman of responding to the prob-
lem of hierarchical inference by acting like an ostrich; Ball may 
have dug his head in the sand but Friedman most certainly does not. 
Whether or not Friedman's theory ultimately withstands scrutiny, 
Friedman is to be praised simply for having a theory of conditional 
relevance and probative value. The phenomenon of inferential 
chains and webs is both real and widespread. It is wonderful to see 
a theorist who, instead of ducking tough inferential problems, 
tackles them. 
III 
Despite my admiration for Friedman's article, I am not yet pre-
pared to endorse every part of Friedman's argument. In particular, 
I do not yet have a firm opinion about whether the kinds of legal 
rules Friedman recommends for dealing with problems of condi-
tional relevance and conditional probative value are a good idea. 
I see three or four general options for legal responses to the 
problem of the admissibility of evidence whose relevance or proba-
tive value is conditional. One possible legal response - a response 
favored by Ball - is to have no specific legal rule to address the 
phenomenon of evidence whose relevance or probative value is 
conditional.14 A second possible legal response is to have special, 
are conditional.) I am only proposing that hierarchical inference has properties that are not 
found in single-stage inference. 
14. This option is not necessarily limited to scholars who share Ball's view that condi· 
tional relevance problems are not sui generis. It is entirely conceivable that scholars who 
believe in the distinctiveness of inferential problems with multiple steps also believe that it is 
better not to have a legal rule that speaks directly about problems involving chains of infer-
ences. One might take this view, for example, if one believes that we do not understand 
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fixed ways of handling special categories of problems of conditional 
relevance and conditional probative value; Professor Dale Nance 
seems to lean in this direction.15 A third possible response is to call 
for judges to make individualized, case-by-case determinations of 
the relevance and probative value of conditionally relevant evi-
dence and conditionally probative evidence, respectively. Finally, 
there is a fourth possible legal response, at least theoretically speak-
ing. The fourth option is to have a legal rule that directs trial judges 
to use a particular analytical procedure in cases in which the rele-
vance or probative value of conditionally probative evidence is 
challenged.16 
Friedman seems to prefer a species of the third type of legal 
response described above; he seems ·to anticipate that under his 
proposed rule about conditional probative value, trial judges would 
make individualized, case-by-case determinations of the probative 
value of conditionally probative evidence. However, I do not think 
the case has yet been made that the third type of response is best. 
More generally, it is not yet clear to me which of the three or four 
legal options I have listed is best; I see possible problems with each 
of them. For example, I worry that the conditional probative value 
rule that Friedman favors will lead to wildly inconsistent rulings on 
the admissibility of conditionally relevant and conditionally proba-
tive evidence. I also wonder whether trial judges who are en-
meshed in real-world, fast-paced, resource-straitened trials would 
have sufficient time to analyze problems of conditional probative 
value with the degree of finesse and subtlety that Friedman's theory 
seems to require. (If it can ever be said that the devil is in the 
details, this can be said about details in inferential reasoning.) By 
hierarchical inference well enough to prescribe by rule how judges should deal with complex 
inferential problems. 
15. See Nance, supra note 3, at 447-48, 472-75, 505-07. Nance has a unique perspective 
on the conditional relevance doctrine. See generally id. Nance's perspective on conditional 
relevance grows out of his more general theory concerning the "best evidence principle." See 
Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 lowA L. REv. 227 (1988). Nance argues that 
it is important to consider how rules of evidence, including the. conditional relevance doc-
trine, work over time; he maintains that if we wish to explain a rule of evidence such as the 
conditional relevance rule, it is necessary - if not sufficient - to view such a rule as a 
component, or ingredient, of a dynamic process. Nance further argues that when we look at 
the conditional relevance rule from this point of view, we find, as a general matter, that the 
best explanation or justification for the conditional relevance doctrine is the best evidence 
principle. Nance, supra note 3, at 472-83. This thesis is provocative and profound; no one 
who wishes to say anything important about conditional relevance can afford to ignore or 
slight it. 
16. I know of no one - including Friedman - who favors this fourth option; that is, thus 
far no evidence scholar has had the hubris to advocate the express and complete codification 
of the analytical technique that he or she happens to favor. 
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the same token, I worry (for example) that the first option - the 
option of having no rule at all concerning conditional relevance or 
conditional probative value - will invite or permit judges to ignore 
subtleties in problems of evidence that really are there.17 
I have yet other worries, doubts, and concerns, both about 
Friedman's proposed replacement for the conditional relevance 
rule and about the two or three other types of possible legal re-
sponses to the phenomenon of conditionally relevant and condi-
tionally probative evidence. So I am not yet sure that it would be a 
good idea to abolish the existing conditional relevance doctrine and 
to replace it with the conditional probative value rule that Fried-
man proposes in his article. But even if Friedman has not come up 
with a convincing solution to the riddle of conditional relevance, he 
has made a sophisticated and subtle argument for his proposed con-
ditional probative value rule, and he deserves our praise for initiat-
ing a scholarly and professional conversation that eventually may 
lead to a consensus. 
17. Perhaps it is better to direct judges to think about such problems as best as they can 
- while recognizing that they will sometimes err and not do their job as they might in more 
ideal circumstances. If one takes this view, one might then favor the type of conditional 
probative value rule that Friedman proposes. 
